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Abstract 
The paper exploits a unique social experiment carried out in 1988 in Sweden to 
identify the effect of monitoring on sickness absence. The treatment consists of 
postponing the first formal point of monitoring during a sickness absence spell, 
a requirement for a doctor’s certificate, from day eight to day fifteen. The 
experiment was conducted in two geographical areas, and the treatment group 
was randomized by birth date. The results show strong effects on sickness 
absence duration from extending the waiting period in both areas. On average, 
the durations increased by 6.6 percent. No effect on incidence of sickness 
absence is found. A heterogeneity analysis reveals that monitoring affects men 
more than women. 
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1 Introduction 
A cornerstone of contract theory is that incentives matter. The last decades 
have witnessed a great development of the theory, and it has been introduced to 
new fields of economics, such as labor economics and insurance markets. 
However, surveys show that purely theoretical studies still exceed in number 
empirical attempts to validate the theory (Chiappori & Salanié, 2000, and 
Prendergast, 1999).  
One area where quite much evidence already is available is public insurance 
programs. In the US, the literature on labor supply effects of worker’s compen-
sation, disability insurance, and most importantly of unemployment insurance 
is extensive. Krueger & Meyer (2002) provide a recent survey of these studies 
concluding that benefit generosity plays a significant role for labor supply of 
the insured. European studies have mainly focused on unemployment insurance 
and public sickness insurance programs, common in most European countries. 
The results support the conclusion by Kruger & Meyer.
1  
The size of the benefit is however not the only policy instrument of interest. 
Theoretically, duration and incidence of benefit take-up can be influenced by 
measures providing more direct incentives to escape the benefit state. Monitor-
ing and sanctions, as well as cash bonuses paid to those who stop claiming for 
benefits quickly are examples.  
Empirical validation of these effects lags behind the literature on benefit 
size, but there are some nice exemptions that are based on experimental data. 
Meyer (1995) and Ashenfelter et al (1999) discuss results from US unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) experiments. The experiments were designed to determine 
the effect on unemployment of cash bonuses or job search programs that often 
consist of both intensified job search assistance and more extensive job search 
verification. The authors conclude that very little seems to be worth the cost. 
Cash bonus experiments that consist of payments to UI recipients who found a 
job quickly (and stayed with that job long enough) are found to be cost-
ineffective. The relative small effects on unemployment duration are easily 
                                                      
1 See Atkinson & Micklewright (1991) and Holmlund (1998) for surveys of the UI literature, and 
Ercolani et al (2002) for a survey on sickness compensation. Swedish studies by Carling et al 
(2001) on UI benefits and unemployment, and Johansson & Palme (1996, 2002, and 2005); 
Henreksson & Persson (2004); Larsson (2005) and Hesselius (2004) on sickness benefits all 
suggest that the benefit size plays a significant role. 
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overweighed by the increase in the claimant population that a permanent adop-
tion of reemployment bonuses is likely to cause. An enforcement of sanctions 
seems to make no difference to total UI benefit payments or the duration of 
benefit claims either. The only policy tool that according to these experiments 
is cost-effective is job search assistance: it leads to small but significant bene-
fits to both workers and society. European evidence from the UI system how-
ever seems to suggest that intensified monitoring and sanctions do affect dura-
tion of unemployment.
2  
Our study addresses the role of incentives through monitoring by using ex-
perimental data on public sickness insurance in Sweden. Our contribution to 
the literature is thus twofold. First, randomized social experiments are ex-
tremely rare in Europe which makes our data unique. The design was very 
clean implying that our results provide credible estimates of the ‘true’ effect.  
Second, our results shed some new light on incentives in the ‘monitoring 
contract’ between the insurance provider and the insured. Quite contrary to the 
conclusion from the UI experiments in the US, we find that eligibility checks 
do play an important role in explaining the duration of compensation claims. 
Our results concern claims from the public sickness insurance, but we argue 
that the conclusion holds even in a broader context. 
Section 2 outlines the experiment and the Swedish sickness insurance. The 
experiment was conducted in the late 1980s in two economically quite different 
areas in Sweden. Half of the insured in both areas were randomized into a 
treatment group according to their date of birth. Treatment consisted of looser 
verification of eligibility: The deadline for providing the sickness insurance 
authorities a doctor’s certificate that proofs reduced working capacity was 
postponed by a week.  
In Section 3 we present the results. The general randomization method 
based on birth date allows us to reconstruct the treatment and control samples 
using administrative data from the National Social Insurance Board. The results 
turn out pronounced: relaxing the monitoring significantly increases absence 
due to sickness. Among the treated, the length of sick spells increased from an 
average of 11.86 days to 12.64 days. We use survival analysis to show that the 
probability of returning back to work is largest just one day before the deadline 
for eligibility verification.  
                                                      
2 See Dolton & O’Neill (1996) and van den Berg & van der Klaauw (2001) for examples of 
studies using experimental data.  
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Section 4 introduces some measures of the economic importance of the re-
sults.The experiment increased sickness benefits expenses but reduced the 
number of visits to a doctor. The cost however was six times higher than the 
benefit. Furthermore, our estimated effect of monitoring on sickness absence 
corresponds to the effect of a six percent increase in the benefit size. Our 
results also suggest that sickness absence could be reduced by nearly ten per-
cent if the deadline for the doctor’s certificate was brought forward to the third 
day of absence. That is the rule in many other European countries.  
These three measures lead us to our conclusion in Section 5 that, quite con-
trary to the results from UI experiments in the US, monitoring does signifi-
cantly shorten the compensated period. 
 
 
2  The Swedish sickness insurance  
Sweden has compulsory national sickness insurance. It is financed by a propor-
tional payroll tax and replaces earnings forgone due to temporary health prob-
lems that prevent the insured worker from doing his regular job. Basically all 
employed workers are automatically covered by the insurance.
3 Benefits are 
related to the lost income during the sick spell.  
Sickness benefits are and have been rather generous: in 1988, a vast major-
ity of workers received 90 percent of their lost income from the public insur-
ance. A benefit cap excluded workers at the very top of the income distribution 
from receiving a full 90 percent. However, besides the public insurance, most 
Swedish workers are covered by negotiated sickness insurance programs regu-
lated in agreements between the labor unions and the employers’ confedera-
tions. In general, these insurances replace about 10 percent of forgone earnings, 
but there is considerable variation. The total compensation could thus be full 
100 percent. 
The public insurance has no limit for how often or how long benefits are 
paid. Many sick spells continue for more than a year but there are examples of 
                                                      
3 The insurance covers even some non-employed persons such as student and job-seekers who 
are registered with the Public Employment Service. Students usually receive the minimum 
amount of benefits whereas the sick benefits of the unemployed in general are determined by 
their income prior to unemployment. 
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even much longer durations. These long spells are more likely to lead to dis-
ability pensions than to a return back to work.  
Since compensation levels are so high, one would expect monitoring of the 
benefit claimants to be strict in order to reduce moral hazard. This is not the 
Swedish case however. On the contrary, public insurance offices have even in 
that sense been quite generous paying out sickness benefits for a week before 
checking the claimants’ eligibility. A sick spell starts when the worker calls the 
public social insurance office (and his or her employer) to report sick. Within a 
week, at latest on the 8
th day of sickness, the claimant should verify eligibility 
by showing a doctor’s certificate that proofs reduced working capacity due to 
sickness. The public insurance office then judges the certificate and decides 
about further sick-leave. It is very rare that the certificate is not approved.  
Of course, some exceptive rules make it possible for the public insurance 
offices to monitor more (or less) strictly. In case they suspect abuse, they can 
visit the claimant at home. Claimants who have been on sickness benefits too 
many times during the past may be asked to show a doctors certificate from day 
one. Moreover, a new sick spell starting within five working days from the first 
is counted as a continuation of the first making it impossible to report sick 
every Monday (and returning ‘back to work’ for the weekends) without ever 
visiting a doctor. Persons with chronic illnesses, on the other hand, do not 
necessarily have to verify their eligibility each time the illness forces them to 
stay at home from work. 
Since 1988, some features of the system have changed. The compensation 
level has been reduced to 80 percent. The benefit cap has not followed the 
inflation rate implying that today, approximately a quarter of the workforce 
receives less than 80 percent of their forgone earnings from the public insur-
ance. Among actual benefit claimants the share is however lower, slightly more 
than 10 percent.
4 In 1993 the generosity was further reduced by an uncompen-
sated qualifying day in the beginning of each sick spell. Since 1991, some of 
the financial (and administrative) burden has been laid on employers in that 
they pay the sickness benefits during the first weeks of sickness.
5  
 
                                                      
4 The figures are for 2003 and come from Larsson (2003). 
5 Their responsibility for the sickness benefits, or ‘sick pay’, has varied from 2 to 4 weeks. In 
June 2005, they pay the full benefits for the two weeks of sickness (except for the qualifying day) 
and after the two weeks a small share of the total cost for the rest of the sick spell. 
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3 The  experiment 
The experiment we use to identify the effect of monitoring was carried out in 
the second half of 1988 in Gothenburg, the second largest city in Sweden, and 
in Jämtland, a small county in the sparsely populated Northern part of Sweden. 
It was initiated by the local social insurance offices.
6  
The purpose of the experiment was to see whether and how sickness ab-
sence is altered when monitoring of the insurance claimants is reduced. A 
randomly assigned treatment group was allowed to receive sickness benefits for 
two weeks without showing a doctor’s certificate, instead of one week as usual. 
The randomization was performed by using the date of birth. All insured born 
on an even date were asked to show a doctor’s certificate after two weeks, 
whereas insured born on an uneven date had to show one already after one 
week.  
The insurance authorities had several arguments for running the experiment. 
In short, all of them were based on an idea that it would imply saving and less 
sickness absence. First, unnecessary visits to a doctor would decrease implying 
less cost for individuals, the medical care system and thereby for the state 
budget. The implementing authorities also believed that doctors, in a routine 
way, prescribe longer absence from work than necessary. With a two week’s 
time limit, many individuals would have time to get back to work before re-
ceiving any such prescription. Finally, and perhaps somewhat contradictory to 
the above arguments, some sick spells were indeed expected to get longer, but 
for a good reason as sick individuals no longer were pushed back to work. This 
in turn would decrease the risk of recurrence of those individuals. 
The background to the experiment, and thus the starting point, differed 
some between the two areas. The idea to test a two weeks’ rule for the doctor’s 
certificate was born in Jämtland and had been in use there for all insured since 
January 1987. In Gothenburg, the usual rule of one week’s unmonitored sick-
ness absence was in use until the experiment. Thus, in Gothenburg, the experi-
ment implied looser rules for half of the insured, whereas in Jämtland, it im-
plied harder rules for half of the insured. In spite of this difference, and to make 
                                                      
6 Until recently, the public insurance was administered by 21 independent local social insurance 
offices that were quite free to design exceptions from the general rules (as long as they were 
towards more generosity). Today, the administration is centralized. 
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the presentation clear, we label the group with a two weeks waiting period as 
the treatment group and the group with a one week waiting period as the con-
trol group.  
The experiment was a non-blind experiment in that all parts were informed 
about it in advance or at latest during the experiment. In fact, it was preceded 
by quite massive local information campaigns. Besides the personnel at the 
local social insurance offices, all employers and medical centers were informed 
in advance about the set-up of the experiment. Written material such as bro-
chures and posters were spread out as well as verbal information through 
meetings and consultants. Also the mass media were an important channel to 
inform the insured. Furthermore, short information about the experiment was 
written on the form that every insured reporting sick must fill in to receive 
sickness benefits.  
We use data from the National Social Insurance Board to reconstruct the 
treatment and control samples and to evaluate the effect of the experiment. The 
data include detailed information about individual sick spells, the birth date, 
and some other characteristics. Table 1 shows the distribution of the insured 
persons in treatment and control groups in the two experiment areas. The 
control group is larger than the treatment group as there are more uneven than 
even dates.
7 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for both Jämtland and Gothenburg sub-
divided into the control group and treatment group, respectively. There are no 
significant differences between the treatment and control groups with respect to 
any of the characteristics: Gender and age distributions as well as average age 
and average sickness absence prior to the experiment are all but equal between 




                                                      
7 To be exact, the samples of treated include some individuals who were excluded from the 
experiment, such as Government employees and some other groups that were comprised by 
special rules. According to the internal report of the experiment, there were approximately 
30,000 (Gothenburg) plus 10,000 (Jämtland) such individuals among the insured. Half of them 
are randomized into the treatment groups but we cannot identify them in the data. However, this 
should only bias the results downward and thus reinforce our conclusion.  
IFAU – Monitoring sickness insurance claimants  8  
Table 1 Number of insured 1 July – 31 December, 1988. 
 Control  group  Treatment  group  Total 
Jämtland  33,135 31,861 64,996 
Gothenburg  121,276 116,115 237,391 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics. 
  Gothenburg Jämtland 








Fraction women  48.1 %  48.2 %  47.6 %  47.5 % 
Mean age  38.15 38.10 38.76 38.85 
Income:      
Mean  1190.35 1195.38 1040.22 1042.61 
25
th  percentile  903 910 830 830 
50
th  percentile  1164 1170 1050 1050 
75
th  percentile  1430 1437 1250 1250 
      
Benefit cap:      
No above cap  8545  8389  785  783 
Percent of total  7.05  7.22  2.37  2.46 
      
Sickness absence 
1/1/88 – 6/30/88: 
    
Incidence  1.23 1.22 1.07 1.05 
Prevalence  15.62 15.52 13.95 13.72 
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A somewhat striking result, however, might be that before the experiment 
sick spells were longer and more common in Gothenburg than in Jämtland. 
Recall that in Jämtland, all insurance claimants were comprised by a two 
weeks’ rule already since January 1987. The geographical variation in Swedish 
sickness absence has changed since 1988. Today, sickness absence is in general 
larger at the country side than in larger cities, and in 2004, sickness absence 
was significantly higher in Jämtland than in Gothenburg.
8 
To further explore on the validity of the randomization device we take a 
closer look at the sickness absence of the treatment and the control group 
before the experiment. Figure 1 and 2 show the estimated survival functions
9 in 
the pre-experimental period, i.e. the fraction of sick that remains after a certain 
number of days in a sickness spell. As expected, there is hardly any difference 
between the treated and the controls.  
However, all three figures indicate a monitoring effect. In Gothenburg be-
fore the experiment, we observe a drop in the survival rate around the 8
th day of 
a sick spell. The pre-experimental survival functions in Jämtland look as ex-
pected somewhat different: The drop in survival function is displayed at the 
15
th day instead of the 8
th day.  
 
                                                      
8 According to figures from the National Social Insurance Board, the average number of sick 
days was 19.4 in Gothenburg and 27.8 in the county of Jämtland. Note that these figures do not 
include sick days during the employers’ period that during 2004 was three weeks. 
9 We use the Kaplan-Meier estimator throughout the survival analysis (Kaplan and Meier, 1958).  
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Figure 1 Fraction still absent due to sickness in Gothenburg during the half 
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Figure 2 Fraction still absent due to sickness in Jämtland during the half year 
before the experiment period (1/1/88 – 6/30/88). 
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4 The  results 
We start by looking at the how monitoring affects absence duration. Given the 
shapes of the survival functions in Gothenburg and Jämtland prior to the ex-
periment we have a strong prior: the looser the checks on eligibility the longer 
the absence spells. Besides duration, we are interested in the incidence of sick 
spells. We address heterogeneity by estimating the effects for various types of 
individuals.  
 
4.1 Duration   
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate how monitoring affects the length of the sick spells by 
survival functions. The dotted line shows the fraction of ongoing sick spells 
among the treated and the continuous line shows the corresponding fraction 
among the controls. The effect is distinct: the survival rate is significantly 
higher for the treatment group during the entire second week.
10  
A closely related way to analyze the effect is to estimate hazards rates. It 
gives us a more detailed picture of when the probability of ending a sick spell 
is largest. Figure 5 and 6 show the results for Gothenburg and Jämtland.
11 It is 
evident that the control group – monitored at day 8 – tends to exit after 7 days 
of absence, whereas the treatment group waits another week before returning 
back to work. The hazard rates also show a weakly cyclical pattern: there is a 
peak in the hazard rate every 7
th day. We believe that it is a common practice 
among the medical doctors to put the patients on a sick-list for full weeks. 
Furthermore, the figures indicate that the monitoring effect starts already 
some days before the actual date of monitoring. The hazard rate of the control 
group is above the rate of the treatment group already at day 5 and 6. The 
opposite holds for day 12 and 13: the probability of returning back to work is 
higher among the treated. We call it a “pre-monitoring effect” and believe that 
it is due to weekends. Most employees work 5 days Monday-Friday and have 
the weekend off. Thus, in the register, a sickness spell that starts on a Monday 
often ends on a Friday, even though the total absent from work is 7 days. 
                                                      
10 The survival estimates and adherent 95% confidence intervals are presented in appendix A. 
11 Estimated using the product-limit method. 
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Figure 4 Fraction still absent due to sickness in the county of Jämtland during 
the experiment period. 
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Figure 6 Hazard rate during the period of the experiment, county of Jämtland. 
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Finally, there seems to be a “post-monitoring effect”, as well. The hazard 
rates of those just monitored are below the hazard rate of the comparison 
population for some time after the date of monitoring. This is most likely due 
to sample selection, or a harvesting effect according to epidemiology literature 
(see e g Schwartz, 2000).
12 Let us be more specific. It is reasonable to assume 
that the date of monitoring “pushes” some people back to work that without 
monitoring would have stayed on sick-leave for some more days. But when 
forced to show a doctor’s certificate in order to continue on sick-leave, they 
perceive the cost of staying on sick-leave higher than the cost of returning to 
work sick. If so, the average health of the population just monitored is worse 
than the average health of the comparison population right after the date of 
monitoring. Consequently, their hazard rate is lower those days than it would 
have been without monitoring.  
 
4.2 Incidence   
One of the arguments for running the experiment was to reduce the risk of 
recurrence as the insured were not pushed back to work ’too early’ while still 
ill. Such an effect would imply fewer sick spells during and after the experi-
ment period. Figure 7 and 8 display the incidence in Gothenburg and in 
Jämtland, before, during and after the experiment. In short, no significant effect 
at all is found on sickness incidence.  
 
4.3  Are the effects the same for everybody? 
We have shown that the effect of monitoring as the same in Gothenburg and in 
Jämtland. This is a useful result for several purposes. First, it convinces us that 
our experiment is not impaired by substitution bias.
13 Recall that the starting 
points were different in these two areas: In Jämtland, the two weeks’ rule had 
been in use there for all insured since January 1987 whereas in Gothenburg, the 
usual rule of one week’s unmonitored sickness absence was in use until the 
experiment. We would thus expect the risk of the control group being treated to 
 
                                                      
12 An alternative explanation would be that doctors prescribe longer sick-leaves than necessary. 
In that case the post-monitoring effect could be taken as a ‘causal’ effect of the monitoring 
device itself. 
13 See Moffitt (2004) for a nice discussion of shortcomings with external validity in randomized 
trials. 




























































Figure 7 Sickness absence incidence per insured individual in Gothenburg, 

































































Figure 8 Sickness absence incidence per insured individual in Jämtland, 
before, during and after the experiment. 
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be higher in Jämtland than in Gothenburg, simply because it must have been 
more difficult to implement harder than looser monitoring. This in turn would 
imply that the estimated effect in Jämtland would be more biased than the 
effect in Gothenburg. The effects are however the same, suggesting that substi-
tution bias is not an issue here. 
Second, we are not worried about the so called Hawthorne effect either. It 
means that individuals respond to the experiment because they know that their 
behavior is being measured. Again, we believe that the asymmetry in the 
starting point would imply different Hawthorne effects in Gothenburg and in 
Jämtland. We can also compare the survival functions during the experiment 
(Figure 3 and 4) with the pre-experimental survival functions (Figure 1 and 2) 
to look for such effects. On the contrary, the treated seem to behave like all 
insured in Jämtland did before the experiment, and the controls behave like all 
insured in Gothenburg did before the experiment.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the effects were the 
same makes it possible to generalize our results. The labor market in Jämtland 
is very different from the labor market in Gothenburg. Jämtland is a rural area 
in the North of Sweden and Gothenburg is the second largest city in Sweden. 
The education level is higher in Gothenburg than in Jämtland and, thus, the 
white/blue collar worker ratio is much higher in Gothenburg than in Jämtland. 
This difference in labor market is also mirrored in the difference in income 
distributions displayed in Table 2. Since the effect estimate in the two regions 
are basically the same we believe that this average effect can be generalized to 
Sweden in large.  
However, we are still interested in other potential dimensions of heterogene-
ity. Anecdotic evidence for example suggests that the moral among the young 
is worse than the moral among the elderly. Besides differences according to (1) 
age, we also test for if the effect of monitoring differs with respects to (2) 
gender and (3) income. 
We estimate proportional hazard models (cf Lancaster, 1990) for each cate-
gory and report the relative risk of the treatment group as compared to the 
control group at day seven and fourteen. Note that estimating proportional 
hazard instead of empirical hazards does not imply any more restrictive as-
sumptions in our case since the experiment implied random assignment. Thus 
the standard critique of erroneously non-proportionality is not relevant, how-
ever we restrict the treatment effects to occur at day 7 and 14 in a spell, thus we 
here neglect the pre- and post-treatment effects.  
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Table 3 shows the results. A relative risk ratio below (above) one means that 
the treatment group has a smaller (larger) probability of exit than the control 
group has. The first row reports the hazard estimates for all observations, 
already shown in Figure 5 and 6. The following rows show that the only statis-
tically significant difference in the monitoring effect is between men and 
women: The relative risk of the treatment group is lower among men than 
among women at day 7, whereas the opposite is the case at day 14. Men seem 
to react much stronger on monitoring than women do. But neither age nor 
income level seems to play any role; the estimated relative risks are basically 
identical for all age and income groups. In other words monitoring seems to 
have the same effect for all these groups. 
How should we explain the different behavior between the sexes? Do men 
simply have (more) lax morals? Maybe, but we cannot exclude that at least part 
of the difference is due to selection. Let us be more specific. In general, the 
group of individuals who are absent due to sickness has different characteristics 
than the overall labor force. Women are more absent due to sickness than men, 
implying that the female ‘sick’ population on average differs less from the 
labor force than the male ‘sick population’ on average does. This, in turn, may 
imply that the ‘sick’ women to behave differently than the ‘sick’ men. One 
explanation for why women are more absent due to sickness is that they due to 
the fertility have more and better contacts with the medical service than men. 
This makes the indirect cost of visiting a doctor lower for women than for men. 
Another thing to note is that, in all subgroups, the effect of monitoring is 
somewhat larger at day 7 than at day 14. We believe that this is due to the 
harvesting effect discussed earlier: At day 14, the sample of controls consists of 
persons with worse health than the treated. Thus the assignment to treatment is 
not really random any more at that point of time, and the monitoring effect is 
ambiguously biased. However, Figure 5 and 6 indicate that this bias is very 
small and hardly statistically significant. In fact, the monitoring effects at day 7 
and 14 are statistically significant different (at the 5 percent level) only when 
estimated for all observations in Gothenburg. When estimated for any of the 
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Table 3 Estimated relative risks between the treatment and the control groups 
at sickness spell day 7 and 14. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  Gothenburg   Jämtland  county 
  Relative risk
a Parameter   Relative  risk
a Parameter 
  Day 7  Day 14 Day 7 Day 14   Day 7 Day 14 Day 7  Day 14 
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Age:            
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a Relative risk = exp(parameter). 
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5  Economic significance of the results  
We have shown that monitoring plays a statistically significant role in explain-
ing the duration of compensation claims. To say something about the economic 
significance of the effect we introduce three measures. First, we compare the 
cost and the benefit of the experiment. The second measure relates the esti-
mated effect of monitoring to the effect of an alternative reform, namely an 
increase of the compensation level. Third, we use our results to calculate how 
much sickness absence in Sweden could be reduced if the deadline for the 
doctor’s certificate was brought forward to the 3
rd day of absence. That is the 
rule in many other European countries.  
 
5.1  Cost and benefits from relaxing monitoring 
Our simple cost benefit analysis compares the cost of increased sickness dura-
tion to the benefit of fewer visits to a doctor. We obtain an estimate of the cost 
by taking the average increase in a sick spell due to the reform times the num-
ber of sick spells times the average cost of one sick day. For simplicity, let us 
base our analysis on figures for Gothenburg. In 1988, the average cost of one 
day’s absence (in terms of sickness benefits) was SEK 296.
14 The number of 
sick spells during the experiment period was 122,123. The average increase in 
a sick spell due to the reform can be calculated using the estimated survival 
functions. The expected duration is 11.84 under a 7 days regime and 12.64 
under a 14 days regime.
15 Thus, the estimated increase is 0.8 days, correspond-
ing to 6.6 percent. Taken these figures together, the estimated cost of extending 
the waiting period for all insured (in Gothenburg) would have been equal to 
approximately SEK 29 million.  
The benefit is determined by the average cost of a doctor’s visit times the 
decrease in the number of visits. According to estimates from the Federation of 
Swedish County Councils, the average cost of a doctor’s visit in 1988 was 
SEK 445.
16 The reduction in the number of visits is again obtained from our 
estimated survival functions. In the control group, 20.6 percent of all spells 
                                                      
14 SEK 100 corresponds to USD 12.8 in June 2005. 
15 These estimates neglect that some spells are censored at day 365. 
16 The cost of a visit to a GP in 1988 is calculated using the cost in 1991 deflated by the average 
visit cost increase within internal medicine and ear, nose, throat care between 1988 and 1991 
(LF, 1988 and LF, 1991) 
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were longer than one week and thus involved a visit to a doctor. In the treat-
ment group, 11.6 percent of the spells were longer than two weeks. Thus ex-
tending the waiting period to fourteen days would potentially reduce the num-
ber of visits to a doctor by 9 percentage units
17. The total number of sick spells 
being 122,123, and assuming that these spells are equally distributed among the 
control and treatment groups, an extension of the waiting period by a week for 
all insured would reduces the number of visit by 10,991. Thus, the benefit 
equals to SEK 4,9 million, which is considerably lower than the estimated cost 
of SEK 29 million.  
Another way of presenting the increased insurance cost is to divide the total 
cost of SEK 29 million by the decreased number of forced physician visits due 
to the certification requirement (0.09*122,123). This yields that the reform is 
cost neutral if the average cost of a physician visit is SEK 2,631. In comparison 
to the actual cost of SEK 445, one can easily see that the cost side of the reform 
is greater than the benefit side. 
  
5.2  Monitoring and compensation level 
From the insurance theory we know that moral hazard can be reduced either by 
increasing the monitoring or by reducing the compensation. An interesting 
policy question is then how much the compensation level must be increased to 
obtain the same increase in work absence as is obtained by relaxing the moni-
toring by one week?  
Using the estimated hazard rates for the two groups, we can simulate the 
proportional increase of the hazard rate necessary to obtain equivalent expected 
duration as monitoring at day 15
th. The calculations are presented in the Ap-
pendix. Using this way of calculating the expected duration, monitoring at the 
15
th day yields an expected duration of 16.18 days. Setting the proportionally 
altered expected duration of monitoring at day 8 equal to 16.18 yields a propor-
tional decrease of the hazard rate by 1.6 percent. Based on and elasticity esti-
mate from Johansson & Palme (2004)
18, an increase in the compensation level 
by 6 percent would lead to an equally large effect as the effects from monitor-
                                                      
17 It is likely that a not so small fraction of the sickness absent has seen a doctor to receive 
medical treatment before the certificate requirement has to be enforced. Thus, the actual number 
of reduced doctors visits is probably smaller than 9 percentage units. 
18 The elasticity with respect to the compensation level is estimated to 0.25. 
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ing. In terms of the compensation level in June 2005 this would imply increas-
ing the compensation level from 0.80 to 0.85.  
 
5.3  The effects of changing waiting time to three days  
Many other European with less work absence demand a doctor certificate 
already at day three in a work absence spell. It is, thus, of interest to see how 
much of the relatively high work absence in Sweden can be attributed to the 
relatively loose monitoring in Sweden. To make such an extrapolation we need 
some assumption about how the monitoring effect depends on duration. Table 3 
indicates that the effect is larger at day 15 than at day 8. However, we argued 
that the effect at day 15 is upward biased due to sample selection.  
To test for whether the ‘true’ monitoring effect is constant over the duration, 
we model both the pre-monitoring effects (1-3 days before the monitoring) and 
the post-monitoring effects (1-7 days after the monitoring) together with the 
monitoring effects within a proportional hazard framework. By explicitly 
introducing the pre- and post-effects in the model we ‘wash off’ the selection 
effect. The estimated monitoring effects turn out to be very close to each other 
at day 8 and 15, as shown in Table 4.  
The predicted baseline hazards for the treatment group and the control 
group are displayed in Figure 9. The predicted baselines are very similar for 
the treatment and control group. This is compelling evidence that the monitor-
ing effect is proportionally constant on the baseline hazard. In Figure 10, the 
observed hazard rates are plotted for the control group (monitoring at day 8) 
together with the simulated (predicted) hazard rate when monitoring at day 8. 
The modeling of the direct monitoring effect together with the pre- and post-
effects seem to yield a nearly precise prediction of the true hazard rate as the 
curves almost coincide. This allows us to calculate the effect of instead reduc-
ing the monitoring date from day 7, again using the estimated survival func-
tions. The result from this exercise is presented in Table 5. Restricting the 
monitoring rule so that a doctor’s certificate must be shown on the 3
rd day of a 
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Table 4 Estimates of the monitoring effect for the Gothenburg experiment using 
Cox proportional hazard estimation method with time-varying covariates.  
   Parameter  (Standard error) Relative risk 
3 days prior  0.070  (0.013)  1.073 
2 days prior  0.254  (0.012)  1.289 
1 day prior  0.199  (0.017)  1.220 
Monitoring effect at day 7  1.099  (0.019)  3.000 
Monitoring effect at day 14  1.164  (0.053)  3.202 
1 day after  -0.350  (0.023)  0.705 
2 days after  -0.582  (0.030)  0.559 
3 days after  -0.392  (0.027)  0.676 
4 days after  -0.296  (0.029)  0.744 
5 days after  -0.282  (0.026)  0.755 
6 days after  -0.049  (0.031)  0.952 
7 days after  -0.152  (0.044)  0.859 
 
 
Table 5 The effect from changing the waiting period on the durations based on 
the Gothenburg experiment.  
 
Expected  
spell length  
(max 365 days) 
Difference from 
monitoring at t = 8, 
in days 
Difference from 
monitoring at t = 8, 
in percent 
Monitoring at t = 3  10.75  -1.12  -9.4 % 
Monitoring at t = 8  11.86  -  - 
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Figure 10 The observed and simulated hazard rate when monitoring at day 8
th, 
based on the control group using the Gothenburg data. 
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6 Conclusions 
We have shown that the degree of monitoring plays an important role in reduc-
ing moral hazard in the Swedish sickness insurance system. This evidence is 
based on a extremely well-performed randomized controlled experiment. 
Besides being highly internal valid the experiment seems to have high external 
validity. Thus, it is possible to simulate policy changes both outside our sample 
and for various potential treatments. 
The results from this experiment together with results from previous studies 
on excess in sickness insurance, suggest that postponing the point of monitor-
ing by one week corresponds to an increase of the compensation level by 6 
percent. From a policy perspective, this is an important trade off: the distribu-
tional (and thus equity) effects of increasing monitoring are considerably 
different from the distributional effects of an overall reduction of the compen-
sation level. 
An interesting aspect in this context is the heterogeneity between men and 
women. Monitoring seems to have a stronger effect on men than on women. 
On the other hand, women are absent due to sickness more often. Thus, men as 
a group are hit harder by increased monitoring, whereas women as a group are 
hit harder by an increase in excess. Of course, in order to judge the equity 
aspects one should know why sickness absence is higher among women. To 
our knowledge, this is still a question for future research.  
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Table A1. Survival rates 
   Gothenburg    Jämtland 
   Control  Treatment     Control Treatment   
Time    
Fraction 
remaining  95% CI   
Fraction 
remaining  95% CI    Difference    
Fraction 
remaining  95% CI   
Fraction 
remaining  95% CI    Difference 
1   100.0  100.0 - 100.0  100.0  100.0 - 100.0  0.0    100.0  100.0 - 100.0  100.0  100.0 - 100.0  0.0 
2   84.7  84.5 - 84.9  84.8  84.7 - 85.0  0.2    81.0  80.6 - 81.4  81.2  80.8 - 81.6  0.2 
3   68.6  68.3 - 68.8  68.9  68.7 - 69.2  0.4    63.4  62.8 - 63.9  63.7  63.1 - 64.2  0.3 
4   57.3  57.1 - 57.6  58.2  57.9 - 58.5  0.9    51.5  51.0 - 52.0  52.3  51.8 - 52.9  0.9 
5   48.9  48.7 - 49.2  50.3  50.0 - 50.5  1.3    43.4  42.8 - 43.9  44.6  44.0 - 45.1  1.2 
6   38.0  37.7 - 38.2  41.6  41.3 - 41.8  3.6    34.0  33.5 - 34.5  36.6  36.1 - 37.1  2.6 
7     33.3  33.0 - 33.5    37.5  37.2 - 37.7    4.2     29.8  29.3 - 30.3    33.0  32.5 - 33.5    3.2 
8   20.6  20.4 - 20.8  31.9  31.6 - 32.1  11.3    19.8  19.4 - 20.2  28.4  27.9 - 28.9  8.6 
9   19.2  19.0 - 19.4  28.7  28.4 - 28.9  9.5    18.1  17.7 - 18.5  25.6  25.1 - 26.1  7.5 
10   18.4  18.2 - 18.6  26.4  26.2 - 26.6  8.0    17.2  16.8 - 17.6  23.6  23.2 - 24.1  6.4 
11   17.4  17.2 - 17.6  24.2  23.9 - 24.4  6.8    16.2  15.8 - 16.5  21.6  21.1 - 22.0  5.4 
12   16.4  16.2 - 16.6  22.1  21.9 - 22.3  5.7    15.2  14.8 - 15.6  19.9  19.5 - 20.3  4.7 
13   15.2  15.0 - 15.4  19.2  19.0 - 19.4  4.0    14.0  13.7 - 14.4  17.6  17.1 - 18.0  3.5 
14     14.2  14.0 - 14.3    17.6  17.4 - 17.8    3.5     13.3  12.9 - 13.6    16.3  15.9 - 16.7    3.1 
15   12.5  12.3 - 12.7  11.6  11.5 - 11.8  -0.9    11.7  11.4 - 12.0  11.4  11.1 - 11.8  -0.3 
16   11.8  11.6 - 12.0  11.1  11.0 - 11.3  -0.7    11.0  10.7 - 11.4  11.0  10.6 - 11.3  -0.1 
17   11.4  11.2 - 11.5  10.8  10.7 - 11.0  -0.5    10.6  10.3 - 10.9  10.8  10.4 - 11.1  0.2 
18   10.7  10.5 - 10.9  10.4  10.2 - 10.5  -0.3    10.0  9.7 - 10.3  10.3  10.0 - 10.7  0.3 
19   10.1  9.9 - 10.2  9.9  9.8 - 10.1  -0.2    9.6  9.3 - 9.9  9.9  9.6 - 10.2  0.3 
20   9.5  9.4 - 9.7  9.4  9.3 - 9.6  -0.1    9.0  8.7 - 9.3  9.4  9.1 - 9.7  0.4 
21     9.0  8.8 - 9.1    9.0  8.9 - 9.2    0.0     8.7  8.4 - 9.0    9.1  8.8 - 9.4    0.4 
22   8.2  8.1 - 8.3  8.4  8.2 - 8.5  0.2    8.2  7.9 - 8.5  8.6  8.2 - 8.9  0.4 
23   7.9  7.8 - 8.1  8.1  7.9 - 8.2  0.2    7.9  7.6 - 8.2  8.3  8.0 - 8.6  0.4 
24   7.7  7.6 - 7.9  7.9  7.8 - 8.0  0.1    7.8  7.5 - 8.1  8.0  7.8 - 8.3  0.3 
25   7.4  7.3 - 7.6  7.6  7.4 - 7.7  0.1    7.5  7.2 - 7.8  7.8  7.5 - 8.1  0.3 
26   7.1  7.0 - 7.3  7.3  7.2 - 7.4  0.1    7.2  6.9 - 7.5  7.5  7.3 - 7.8  0.4 
27   6.9  6.7 - 7.0  7.0  6.9 - 7.1  0.1    6.9  6.7 - 7.2  7.3  7.0 - 7.6  0.4 
28     6.6  6.5 - 6.7    6.7  6.6 - 6.9    0.1     6.7  6.4 - 7.0    7.0  6.7 - 7.3    0.3  
Appendix B 
Equal sickness absence rate 
How much do we need to proportionally affect the hazard rate to get the same 
effect on expected duration of monitoring at day 15 instead of at day 8? The 
survival can be expressed as: 
 













Furthermore, the expected duration is given by: 
 












Given maximum spell length of 365 days in the data, the expected duration for 
the control group (monitoring at day 8) is 11.86 and for the treatment group 
(monitoring at day 15) 12.64. This gives: 
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The hazard rates for durations longer than 365 days are assumed to be equal for 
the control and the treatment group. As the data does not allow us to have a 
greater follow-up period than 365 days, the hazard rate from the 365
th day of 
duration and onwards is set to the mean hazard rate of the last 30 days of the 
365 day follow-up period. More precise, the hazard rate from day 365 and 
onwards   is set to 0.001890.   ( 365 h
The last term in (3) can be rewritten as: 
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Putting this into (5) yields: 
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The survival rates for the control and treatment groups at day 365 are not 
significantly different from each other. Due to this, the survival rate at day 365 
is set to the mean of the two groups’ survival rate at this time of duration. 





























This can be calculated in the same way for the treatment group, which gives an 
expected duration for the treatment group of 16.18.  
The expected duration for the control group with a proportionally affected 
hazard rate can be expressed as: 
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Setting the expected duration of the proportionally affected control group 
hazard rate equal to the expected duration of the treatment group solves the 
puzzle. As an analytical solution is not possible to obtain, the following equa-
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A proportional decrease of the hazard rate of 1.6 percent yields the same ag-
gregated sickness absence rate in the society as an extension of the no-
monitoring period from 7 to 14 days. 
 Publication series published by the Institute for Labour 
Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)  –  latest issues 
 
Rapporter/Reports 
2005:1  Ahlin Åsa & Eva Mörk ”Vad hände med resurserna när den svenska skolan 
decentraliserades?” 
2005:2  Söderström Martin & Roope Uusitalo ”Vad innebar införandet av fritt skolval 
i Stockholm för segregeringen i skolan?” 
2005:3  Fredriksson Peter & Olof Åslund ”Påverkas socialbidragsberoende av om-
givningen?” 
2005:4  Ulander-Wänman Carin ”Varslad, uppsagd, återanställd. Företrädesrätt till 
återanställning enligt 25 § LAS i praktisk tillämpning” 
2005:5  Isacsson Gunnar ”Finns det en skillnad mellan samhällets och individens   
avkastning på utbildning?” 
2005:6  Andersson Christian & Iida Häkkinen “En utvärdering av personalförstärk-
ningar i grundskolan” 
2005:7  Hesselius Patrik, Per Johansson & Laura Larsson ”Hur påverkar kravet på 
läkarintyg sjukfrånvaron? Erfarenheter från ett socialt experiment” 
 
Working Papers 
2005:1  Ericson Thomas “Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review” 
2005:2  Lundin Martin “Does cooperation improve implementation? Central-local 
government relations in active labour market policy in Sweden” 
2005:3  Carneiro Pedro, James J Heckman & Dimitriy V Masterov “Labor market 
discrimination and racial differences in premarket factors” 
2005:4  de Luna Xavier & Ingeborg Waernbaum “Covariate selection for non-
parametric estimation of treatment effects” 
2005:5  Ahlin Åsa & Eva Mörk “Effects of decentralization on school resources” 
2005:6  Cunha Flavio, James J Heckman & Salvador Navarro “Separating uncer-
tainty from heterogeneity in life cycle earnings” 
2005:7  Söderström Martin & Roope Uusitalo “School choice and segregation: evi-
dence from an admission reform” 
2005:8  Åslund Olof & Peter Fredriksson “Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures – 
quasiexperimental evidence” 
2005:9  van der Klaauw Bas, Aico van Vuuren & Peter Berkhout “Labor market 
prospects, search intensity and the transition from college to work” 
      
2005:10  Isacsson Gunnar “External effects of education on earnings: Swedish   
evidence using matched employee-establishment data” 
2005:11  Abbring Jaap H & Gerard J van den Berg “Social experiments and instru-
mental variables with duration outcomes” 
2005:12  Åslund Olof & Oskar Nordström Skans “Measuring conditional segregation: 
methods and empirical examples” 
2005:13  Fredriksson Peter & Bertil Holmlund “Optimal unemployment insurance 
design: time limits, monitoring, or workfare?” 
2005:14  Johansson Per & Per Skedinger “Are objective measures of disability   
reliable?” 
2005:15  Hesselius Patrik, Per Johansson & Laura Larsson “Monitoring sickness 
insurance claimants: evidence from a social experiment” 
 
Dissertation Series 
2003:1  Andersson Fredrik “Causes and labor market consequences of producer 
heterogeneity” 
2003:2  Ekström Erika “Essays on inequality and education” 